ABSTRACT
Introduction
I consider an economy with a fixed number J of similar industries.
1 Each industry possesses a fixed amount L of labor, a representative firm and a representative labor union. To examine the political economy of growth and economic integration, the model is composed as follows:
(i) Firms produce one unit of output from one labor unit. The prices are determined by oligopolistic competition.
(ii) Workers and firms bargain over wages.
(iii) Firms invest in R&D to escape production costs.
(iv) The decision maker of the economy, called the central planner, has its own interests and regulates the product and labor markets. The interest groups that represent workers and firms lobby the central planner.
I summarize the institutional structure of the model as:
Representatives Representatives Agents in wage bargaining in lobbying the central planner Workers Labor unions Worker lobby Firms
Employer federation Employer lobby I use the common agency model (e.g. Bernheim and Whinston (1986) , Grossman and Helpman (1994a) , and Dixit at al. (1997) to establish a political equilibrium with the following sequence of decisions:
1. Worker and employer lobbies make their offers to the central planner.
These offers relate the lobbies' prospective political contributions to the central planner's policy.
2. The central planner regulates the product and labor markets. Product market regulation determines how much firms can coordinate their actions in price settlement, and labor market regulation determines the relative power of the labor unions in wage bargaining.
3. Unions and employers bargain over the wages.
4. Firms decide how much to invest in R&D.
5. Each firm decides on its output given its expectations on the behavior of the other firms.
6. The households decide on their consumption.
This extended game is solved by backward induction.
Production and consumption
In industry j ∈ {1, ..., J}, a single firm (hereafter firm j) produces good j from labor with technology
where y j output, n j labor input in production and B j is the productivity parameter. I assume that all products j ∈ {1, ..., J} are perfect substitutes, for simplicity.
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All households in the economy share the same preferences and take income, the prices and the interest rate r as given. Thus, they all behave as if there were a single representative household which chooses its flow of consumption C to maximize its utility starting at time T ,
where θ is time, C consumption and ρ > 0 the constant rate of time preference. The total supply of the composite good, C, is the sum of industrial outputs y j , C = J j=1 y j .Noting this, the maximization leads to the Euler equation [cf. Grossman and Helpman (1994b) ]
where p the consumption price, E total consumption expenditure, r the interest rate andĖ = dE/dt. Because in the model there is no money that would pin down the nominal price level at any time, it is convenient to normalize total consumption expenditure E at the constant number J of industries. This and (2) yield
3 Firms
Competition in the product market
Following Dixit (1986) , I assume that each firm j anticipates the reaction of the other firms k = j by
where ϕ ∈ (0, 1) is a measure of the firms' market power. If ϕ = 0, the firms behave in Cournot manner, taking each others' output level as given. The higher ϕ, the more the firms can coordinate their actions and the higher price they can charge. The central planner can decrease (increase) ϕ by intensifying (weakening) its competition and anti-trust policies. The product market is fully deregulated for ϕ = 0. I assume, for simplicity, uniform initial productivity in the economy, B 0 k = B 0 for all k. This implies symmetry y k = y for all k. Noting (3) and (4), the inverse of the anticipated price elasticity of demand for firm j is then
By controlling ϕ, the central planner can determine φ. Firm j maximizes its profit π j . = py j − w j n j , where y j is output, by its labor input n j holding the wage w j and productivity B j constant, given the production function (1) and the price elasticity of the demand for output, (5). Noting (3), this maximization yields the conditions
Results (5) show that labor input in production, n j , can be constant, provided that the wage w j and the profit π j change in the same proportion. Without this property, there could not be a steady state in the model.
Research and development (R&D)
Technological change for firm j is characterized by a Poisson process q j as follows. During a short time interval dθ, there is an innovation dq j = 1 with probability Λ j dθ, and no innovation dq j = 0 with probability 1 − Λ j dθ, where Λ j is the arrival rate of innovations in the research process. The arrival rate Λ j is an increasing function of labor devoted to R&D, l j ,
where λ and ν are constants. Decreasing returns to scale ν ∈ (0, 1) in R&D are assumed to ensure the existence of equilibrium. Following Horii and Iwaisako (2007) , this can be justified by the possibility of duplication: when two workers innovate in the same industry, they produce very likely less than a double amount of innovations. I denote the serial number of technology in industry j by t j and variables depending on technology t j by superscript t j . The invention of a new technology raises t j by one and the level of productivity B t j j by a > 1. Hence,
During a short time interval dθ, there is a change in technology from t j to t j + 1 with probability Λ j dθ, and no change with probability 1 − Λ j dθ, where Λ j is (5).
The average growth rate of the level of productivity (6) in the stationary state is in fixed proportion (λ log a) to l 1−ν j [cf. Aghion and Howitt (1998), p. 59] and thereby an increasing function of l j . Thus, research input l j can be used as a proxy of the growth rate in industry j.
Firm j's dividends are given by
where π j is profit, w j the wage in industry j, l j labor devoted to R&D and w j l j expenditures on R&D. Firm j maximizes the present value of its dividends (7) by its investment in R&D, l j , subject to technological change, given the wage w j . The value of firm j at time T is
where θ is time, E the expectation operator and r the interest rate. In Appendix A, I show that this optimization leads to the two results:
(i) The ratio of dividends to profits, Π j /π j , is a decreasing function of labor devoted to R&D, l j as follows:
This is explained by decreasing returns to scale in R&D.
(ii) The constraint w j n j /π j = 1/φ − 1 in (5) can be transformed into the form where labor devoted to production, n j , is a decreasing function of the firms' share of value added, φ, but total labor input n j + l j is an increasing function of labor devoted to R&D, l j :
Wage bargaining
Because each industry j possesses a fixed amount L of labor, its full-employment constraint is given by
where n j and l j are labor inputs in production and R&D. In each industry j, the workers' wage w j is determined by bargaining between a union representing workers in industry j (hereafter union j) and a federation representing the employers of these workers (hereafter employer j). On the assumption that both parties of bargaining are risk neutral, the problem can be solved as an alternating-offers game. I also assume that the workers have access to perfect unemployment insurance. This ensures that 6 all workers in the same industry behave as if there were only one worker in that industry.
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I assume, furthermore, that in the case of a dispute there is no production, and consequently neither labor income nor profits. The reference income is then zero for both the union and the employer.
In wage bargaining, at each time T , labor union j maximizes the expected present value of wages,
and federation j maximizes the expected present value of dividends
subject to the full-employment constraint (9) and the firms' behavior as a producer and an investor. The outcome of this bargaining can be obtained through maximizing the Generalized Nash Product U 
The economy
I consider a symmetric equilibrium with B 0 j = B 0 , in which case n j = n, l j = l, w j = w and π j = π holds true, In that equilibrium, noting (9) and (12), the full-employment constraint (9) and the constraint α ≤ 1 can be written as:
By (1), (3), (9) and (9), I define the present value of the expected flow of real income per industry, y, as [cf. Aghion and Howitt (1998) 
Holding the firms' share of value added, φ, constant, a higher level of R&D (i.e. a bigger l) increases the present value of the expected flow of real income, Ψ.
The unions and the firms lobby the central planner which decides on the firms' market power ϕ and the unions's relative bargaining power α. Following Grossman and Helpman (1994a) , I assume that the central planner has its own interests and collects contributions R u and R f from the union and employer lobbies. A member of the worker lobby earns wages (n + l)w minus political contributions R u . A member of the employer lobby earn dividends Π minus political contributions R u . Because the effects through the the price level p can be internalized at the level of the economy, the worker lobby maximizes the present value U of the expected flow of a typical worker's real income [(n + l)w − R u ]/p, and the employer lobby maximizes the present value F of the expected flow of a typical firm's real dividends (Π − R f )/p at time T . Noting (9), (12), (13) and (13), these targets can be defined as:
Noting (13), the present value the expected flow of the real political contributions at time T is given by
Given this and (13), I specify the central planner's utility function as follows:
where constants ζ w ≥ 0 and ζ f ≥ 0 are weights of the worker's and the firm's welfare in the government's preferences, respectively.
The objective function of Grossman and Helpman (1994a) , (15), is widely used in models of common agency and it has been justified as follows. The politicians are mainly interested in their own income which consists of the contributions from the public, R u + R f , but because they must defend their position in general elections, they must sometimes take the utilities of the interest groups U(l, φ, R u ) and F(l, φ, R f ) into account directly. The linearity of (15) in Ψ[R u + R f ] is assumed, for simplicity.
6 The political equilibrium I assume for a while that the central planner can smoothly regulate unions' and firms' market power (α, ϕ). The results can then be extended for the case where the central planner's choices are more discrete.
Because the function (α, φ) establishes one-to-one correspondence from the central planner's instrument α to l, one can in the model consider labor devoted to R&D (= the measure of the growth rate, cf. subsection 3.2) l as a policy variable. The unions' and employers' lobbies try to affect the central planner by their contributions R u and R f . The contribution schedules are therefore functions of the central planner's policy variables:
The central planner maximizes its utility function (15) by (l, φ) , given the contribution schedules (15) and the constraints (5) and (12). Following proposition 1 of Dixit at al. (1997) , a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for this game is a set of contribution schedules R u (l, φ) and R f (l, φ) and policy (l, φ) such that the following conditions (i) − (iv) hold:
(i) Contributions R u and R f are non-negative but no more than the contributor's income.
(ii) The policy (φ, l) maximizes the central planner's welfare (15) taking the contribution schedules R u and R f as given,
(iii) The worker lobby (employer lobby) cannot have a feasible strategy R u l, φ) (R f l, φ)) that yields it a higher level of utility than in equilibrium, given the central planner's anticipated decision rule,
(iv) The worker lobby (employer lobby) provides the central planner at least with the level of utility than in the case it offers nothing R u = 0 (R f = 0), and the central planner responds optimally given the other lobby's contribution function,
Noting (15) and (16), the central planner's utility function (15) changes into
The Lagrangean for the maximization of the central planner's utility function (16) by (l, φ) subject to the constraints (5) and (12) is given by
where the multipliers ε and ϑ satisfy the conditions
Noting (9), (12), (13), (16) 
There are two possibilities in labor market regulation:
(a) If the labor market is deregulated, α → 0, then, by (12), there is full employment L = l + n (l, φ) . In that case, there cannot be monopoly unions α = 1 that can dictate wages and, by (12), (17) and (18) 
